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RECASTING THE DYNAMICS OF POST-ACQUISITION 




M&A scholars have generally assumed that post-acquisition integration is a self-contained 
process. However this ignores that this process rarely unfolds as the only ongoing initiative in 
an organization. We contend that post-acquisition integration is not detached from other 
simultaneous change processes in the organizational context and this has important implications 
for our understanding of how integration dynamics actually evolve. To further understand this 
embeddedness we examine the unfolding of a post-acquisition integration process in a company 
faced with an unanticipated drop in demand due to the global economic crisis. Through a 
qualitative, longitudinal study conducted over three years, we carried out 151 interviews to 
uncover the unfolding of the post-acquisition process. We find that post-acquisition integration 
is embedded in a set of co-evolving processes. We highlight four mechanisms (coordination, 
cohesion, disconnection, alienation) that arise from the co-evolution of processes that either 
facilitate or impede integration. Our findings contribute to our understanding of post-
acquisition integration dynamics by recasting the integration process as embedded in a set of 




Post-acquisition integration is critical for reaping the expected benefits of the deal, harvesting 
synergies and creating value (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Post-acquisition integration 
represents a major organizational change process that requires extensive effort and resource 
dedication (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999) and may divert managerial attention away from core 
activities (Yu et al., 2005). A challenge for acquiring firms is thus to deal with a demanding 
integration process, while maintaining focus on their ongoing activities (Puranam et al., 2003). 
However, an integration process rarely unfolds as a single initiative in an organization. Rather, 
organizations often carry out multiple and overlapping changes (Hafsi, 2001; Pettigrew et al., 
2001). Managers in acquiring firms are thus faced with balancing integration of the focal 
acquisition and ongoing operations, while simultaneously managing other change processes.  
Extant Mergers and Acquisitions (“M&A”) research has largely examined post-acquisition 
integration processes as isolated events (Laamanen and Keil, 2008). In this manner scholars 
have focused on managerial decisions and outcomes of the focal integration process without 
acknowledging the broader organizational context within which these decisions and outcomes 
unfold. This organizational context consists of strategic issues and change processes that, 
although exogenous to the focal acquisition, may significantly shape the integration process 
and its outcomes. We argue that to further our understanding of the dynamics and complexities 
of post-acquisition integration, we need to broaden the focus of inquiry beyond the specific 
integration process. Thus, in this study, we ask: ‘how is the unfolding of the integration process 
shaped by other strategic initiatives and ongoing changes in the organizational context?’  
In order to gain a rich understanding of how post acquisition integration may unfold, we gained 
access to a French multinational company (MNC-Metals) as it was acquiring a Norwegian firm 
(Beta-Mang). Shortly after the acquisition announcement, the companies faced a significant 
drop in demand due to the economic crisis of 2008. This presented managers with major 
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challenges in carrying out the integration process, while managing the consequences of the drop 
in demand. Distressed firms face scarce resources, diminished managerial discretion and 
restrictive stakeholders (Trahms et al., 2013). As such, the case represented a particularly 
revealing opportunity to explore inductively how the unfolding integration process is shaped 
by other ongoing initiatives in the organization.  
Our findings are twofold. First, we identified three ongoing processes in the firms: operations, 
crisis management, and post-acquisition integration processes. We found that organizational 
members’ perceptions and actions, and ultimately integration outcomes, are intertwined across 
these processes. In this manner, the focal integration process does not unfold as a self-contained 
process, but rather as embedded within a set of co-evolving organizational processes. Second, 
we identified four mechanisms (coordination, cohesion, disconnection, alienation) that either 
facilitate or impede integration, thus shaping the unfolding of the integration process.  
Our findings contribute to the understanding of post-acquisition integration dynamics. First, we 
theorize integration dynamics by recasting the post-acquisition integration process as embedded 
in a set of ongoing, simultaneous and co-evolving processes. Second, we conceptualize the 
micro tensions inherent in task and human integration processes that shape the unfolding of 
post-acquisition integration. Third, we uncover how the loci of causal ambiguity between 
integration decisions and outcomes may be exogenous to the integration process itself. Finally, 
we identify the contingencies for managerial agency in post-acquisition integration as dynamic 
and emergent, leading to a refined understanding of unintended integration outcomes.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Post-acquisition integration is a means to manage interdependencies and secure efficient and 
effective use of resources by making “changes in the functional activity arrangements, 
organizational structures and systems, and cultures of combining organizations” (Pablo, 1994: 
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806). M&A scholars have addressed the challenge managers face in defining the appropriate 
level of integration as the integration-autonomy dilemma (Zaheer et al., 2013). On the one hand, 
integration is required for knowledge and capability transfers and to achieve coordination 
benefits and synergies (Bresman et al., 1999; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). On the other 
hand, there is a need to preserve the autonomy of the target, as integration may disrupt the task 
environment, and subsequently destroy the target’s capabilities (Graebner, 2004; Puranam et 
al., 2003; 2006; Puranam et al., 2009).  
Depending on the need for autonomy and the need for strategic interdependence, managers can 
choose different integration approaches to secure value creation. The target and the acquiring 
firms may blend into one new organization, the acquirer may assimilate the target, or the target 
may become a stand-alone after the acquisition (Angwin and Meadows, 2015). Scholars have 
suggested hybrid approaches to integration, allowing for linking of non-core activities, while 
preserving the strategic capabilities of the firm (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, Schweizer, 
2005).  
Research has focused on the integration process as shaped by managers’ decisions regarding 
mode and speed of integration, that ultimately influence acquisition outcomes (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Pablo, 1994). Birkinshaw et al. (2000) contend that 
managers seek to limit the risks associated with integration by first attending to the pre-
acquisition units’ performance, before coordinating activities between the units. They 
distinguish between task integration and human integration. Task integration involves the 
transfer of capabilities and sharing of resources, while human integration is defined as the 
generation of satisfaction and the development of a shared identity among employees of both 
firms. Successful integration requires initial limited task integration, allowing firms to develop 
social relations, subsequently laying the foundations for later coordination. Noting the lack of 
clarity in the causal link between integration decisions and their performance outcomes, 
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Cording et al. (2008) introduced the concept of “intermediate goals” that mediate the 
relationship between acquisition decisions and acquisition outcomes within the focal 
integration process. Extant research has thus searched for explanatory factors for M&A 
outcomes by exploring the link between integration decisions and outcomes, largely ignoring 
the context the integration process is embedded in.  
Organizations regularly undergo multiple and overlapping changes (Pettigrew et al. 2001). 
Subsequently, the integration process unfolds in a context of other ongoing organizational 
changes and strategic initiatives that are exogenous to the integration process itself. The 
organizational context is not just a stimulus environment, but a nested arrangement of structures 
and processes shaped by the subjective interpretations of actors (Pettigrew, 1992). The 
organizational context in which decision makers operate, determines what issues they give 
attention to, and their subsequent actions (Ocasio, 1997). Post-acquisition, managerial 
resources are strained as managers need to deal with business-as-usual and resource demanding 
integration activities. We know that lack of managerial attention to integration issues is 
detrimental to acquisition outcomes (Yu et al., 2005). However, our knowledge is limited of 
how strategic initiatives and organizational changes exogenous to post-acquisition integration, 
may strain managerial resources and thus shape integration decisions and managerial actions 
during post-acquisition integration. We argue that to further our knowledge of the dynamics of 
post-acquisition integration processes and the link between integration decisions and 
integration outcomes, it is necessary to go beyond the integration process itself, and examine it 




In July 2008, the first author met the newly appointed integration manager from MNC-Metals 
at a yearly meeting of a professional association. This person was sensitive to the difficulties 
that companies usually face during integration processes and was willing to launch a research 
project designed to examine the integration process over time. The original goal of the research 
project was to analyze the integration process within the organizations and to examine 
employees’ perceptions during this major organizational change through a longitudinal, 
qualitative case study approach. The case study is the appropriate research technique for 
studying complex phenomena within their contexts (Yin, 1994). To understand the complexities 
of the post-acquisition integration process, it is necessary to let the integration process reveal 
itself in a temporal and contextual manner (Pettigrew, 1990). Qualitative methods offer rich 
information (Miles and Huberman, 1994), not accessible by cross sectional survey based 
methodologies and are well suited to access organizational members’ accounts and 
interpretations (Maitlis, 2005). In this study, we adopted an interpretivist approach and analyzed 
the case from the perspective of those living it (Corley, 2015). 
As we were planning our first data gathering in September 2008, a drop in demand suddenly 
and strongly, hit the case companies. Even though the case, as such, is a convenience case, it is 
also a revelatory case (Harrison and Rouse, 2015; Patton, 1990) as it provided us with an 
unexpected and unique opportunity to examine in real time how the consequences of an event, 




We examine the acquisition of Beta-Mang by MNC-Metals. MNC-Metals is a French 
Multinational operating in 20 countries over five continents. It is the second largest producer 
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of high-grade manganese ore and manganese alloys, and the leading producer of refined 
manganese alloys worldwide. At the industry level, more than 90% of the total world production 
of manganese is used in the form of ferro-alloys, mainly in the steel industry (construction, 
automobile). Before the acquisition of Beta-Mang in 2008, MNC-Metals already had a 
Norwegian subsidiary: Alpha-Mang. Alpha-Mang consisted of two manganese plants acquired 
by MNC-Metals in 1999. Each plant had around 200 employees. Since 1999, MNC-Metals had 
invested considerably in the Norwegian plants. The central headquarters of MNC-Metals in 
Paris allowed Alpha-Mang substantial autonomy on operational issues. The top management 
team of Alpha-Mang consisted of Norwegian nationals, except for the CFO, who was French. 
Alpha-Mang and Beta-Mang had a long-standing, commercial relationship prior to the 
acquisition. 
Beta-Mang was a Norwegian family-owned company founded in 1875. Beta-Mang consisted 
of a silico-manganese plant (200 employees) and a titanium and high purity iron plant (200 
employees). Beta-Mang had a trading subsidiary for metallurgical product (67 employees) and 
shares in several power plants in Norway. In 2007, Beta-Mang recorded a turnover of €931 
million.  
Immediately after the acquisition, MNC-Metals divested the trading subsidiary and the power 
plants of Beta-Mang. The titanium plant was integrated into another branch of MNC-Metals. 
Our case is thus the integration of Beta-Mang silico-manganese plant, into the existing 
Norwegian operations of Alpha-Mang, implying the coordination of the three plants at the 
Norwegian subsidiary level.  
Data gathering  
Our case data consists of rich, longitudinal, primary data (in-depth interviews and informal 
observations and conversations) and secondary archival data (integration newsletters, 
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integration plans and other internal documents). The archival data mostly addressed the 
financial structure of the deal and helped us to understand the timeline of events. These 
documents complemented our in-depth interviews and helped triangulate some of our findings. 
We conducted 3 rounds of data collection in the headquarters of MNC-Metals and in the 
Norwegian plants of Alpha-Mang and Beta-Mang. The first consisted of 56 interviews, from 
May to July 2009. Through these interviews we gained insight into the research setting and 
built interactional expertise, which is needed to fully grasp context in a qualitative process study 
(Collins, 2004; Langley et al, 2013). At this point, the plants were directly impacted by the drop 
in demand thus allowing us to collect real-time data about managers’ actions to cope with the 
crisis and employees’ perceptions on these initiatives. From November 2009 to February 2010, 
production slowly returned to pre-crisis levels. During this period, we conducted our second 
round of data collection consisting of 49 interviews. Finally, from November 2010 to January 
2011, we conducted our third round of data collection consisting of 46 interviews. At this point 
the production and the support functions (R&D and HRM) of the three plants were coordinated 
at the Norwegian level. Furthermore, the Norwegian subsidiary began coordinating its activities 
with MNC-Metals’subsidiaries in Gabon and in the USA. 
In order to ensure that multiple viewpoints were captured in our data, we interviewed people 
from different plants and at different levels of the organizations. Key informants were chosen 
on the basis that they had access to specific information relevant to the research enquiry. This 
included top management team, HR personnel, and employees with specific integration 
responsibilities.  
INSERT TABLE A.1 ABOUT HERE 
The interview guide consisted of open-ended questions in order to encourage informants to 
account for their experiences of the integration and the crisis. For instance, we asked informants 
to share their perceptions about how the integration process was managed; how the drop in 
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demand was handled and how they were affected by the changes linked to the integration 
process or to the crisis management initiatives. Follow-up questions were used to get beneath 
general responses and to further explore key issues. As the informants shared their experiences, 
they were also encouraged to give their assessments and feelings towards the events and actions 
they described. We conducted the interviews in the native language of each respondent (either 
Norwegian or French). Interviews typically lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. We interviewed 
until saturation in each phase, that is, until each new interview added little new information 
(Charmaz, 2006). After each phase of data collection, we presented our findings to the top 
management of MNC-Metals in Paris. This feedback process constituted an opportunity to 
discuss and validate our findings. 
Data analysis 
All interviews were transcribed, yielding approximately 2,700 double spaced pages of 
transcripts. We read and re-read the transcripts, looking for recurring themes in the data (Van 
Maanen, 1998). We conducted an inductive and iterative analysis organized in four main 
phases. In the first phase, we extracted quotes that reflected the stories of the post-acquisition 
integration process (Langley et al., 2012). Dominant themes in our informants’ accounts were 
their perceptions of events and activities unfolding related to the three distinct processes of 
crisis management, post-acquisition integration and ongoing operations. We gathered raw data 
into categories (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996) that encompassed operations management, crisis 
management, integration management. This prompted us to focus on how these processes were 
intertwined. We specifically paid attention to our informant’s descriptions of the relationships 
between the processes, exemplified by claims such as: “it has been implemented faster because 
of the crisis” or “it was slowed down because of temporary lay-offs due to the crisis”. Parallel 
to this first step of inductive coding of interviews, we carefully analyzed the content of archival 
data. For example, we juxtaposed quotes from our interview data related to expected and 
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achieved synergies with descriptions of planned and achieved synergies in the integration 
newsletters. MNC-Metals and Beta-Mang had defined, in the pre-acquisition phase, the time 
(in months) needed to implement the main synergies (optimization of raw material supply, 
specialization of plants and coordination in purchase and logistics). We compared the schedule 
with actual progress to see whether the changes associated with each synergy were implemented 
faster or slower than planned.  
In the second coding phase, we went back to the data and uncovered four mechanisms that 
underlie faster or slower achievement of synergies. We identified cohesion (i.e. informants’ 
descriptions of the crisis as a common enemy to fight against), alienation (i.e. informants’ 
descriptions of lack of interactions between the plants), coordination (i.e. informants’ 
descriptions of increased synergy hunt and implementation of coordination structures) and 
disconnection (i.e. informants’ descriptions of perception of competition for resources) as key 
categories.  
Third, we reverted to the literature on post-acquisition integration to make sense of our 
preliminary findings on the four mechanisms. In line with Birkinshaw et al., (2000), we 
identified coordination and disconnection as components of task integration and cohesion and 
alienation as components of human integration. 
Fourth, following axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), we searched for relationships 
between the mechanisms identified in the previous coding phases. As such, we abstracted 
dynamic tensions between coordination and disconnection and dynamic tensions between 
alienation and cohesion as presented in our emergent model in the findings section. 
FINDINGS  
In the following section, we present our findings in a narrative manner with quotes to illustrate 
our interpretations. Following Langley’s recommendations (1999) on temporal bracketing, we 
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first present our findings as a description of events that reflects the reality of the integration 
process. We have identified three phases: (1) pre-acquisition: acquisition announcement and 
integration planning, (2) early post-acquisition: drop in demand and crisis management and (3) 
later post-acquisition: back to normal operations and finalizing integration. From this 
longitudinal and narrative analysis, we then present two models that emerged from our data 
analysis. First, our data show how the post-acquisition integration process co-evolves with other 
ongoing and overlapping processes in the organization. We identified three main ongoing 
processes: 1) integration, 2) crisis management and 3) operations. We observed that 
organizational members’ perceptions, actions and outcomes, related to each process, were 
intertwined. Second, we found a set of mechanisms (cohesion, alienation, coordination and 
disconnection) that arise from this set of co-evolving processes and that both facilitated and 
impeded task and human integration.  
 
Pre-acquisition: Acquisition announcement and integration planning 
MNC-Metals announced the friendly acquisition of Beta-Mang in April 2008. The overall goal 
of the acquisition was to reinforce MNC-Metals’ position as one of the world’s leading 
producers of manganese alloy. MNC-Metals estimated an increase in the production of 
manganese alloy from the acquisition of approximately 20%. Top managers of both firms 
expected minimum annual operational synergies of €10 million to €15 million from cost saving, 
revenue enhancement and knowledge sharing. These would be achieved by securing Beta-
Mang’s supplies of low-carbon manganese, increasing production capacity, improving value 
chain coordination and gaining economies of scale in purchasing and logistics. To achieve these 
synergies, the two Alpha-Mang plants’ furnaces would now specialize in low carbon 
manganese, while the Beta-Mang plant would specialize in silico-manganese. By only focusing 
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on only one product per furnace, maintenance costs would be reduced and production capacity 
and efficiency increased. No reduction in workforce was planned. 
Synergies were also expected from exchanges of knowledge and best practices in operation 
management, health and safety at work. Indeed, the Beta-Mang plant had outstanding records 
for health and safety at work (few incidents were recorded the five years prior to the 
acquisition). MNC-Metals intended to transfer Beta-Mang’s health and safety procedures to 
Alpha-Mang plants to reduce the frequency and severity rates of incidents in its plants. The 
integration plan included the implementation of all operational synergies within a year post-
acquisition. To facilitate control, IT systems coordination was to be implemented in 
approximately nine months post-acquisition. 
In June 2008, MNC-Metals acquired 56% of Beta-Mang shares. Beta-Mang had had two main 
owners with 93% of the total shares (respectively 56 and 37%). The deal stated that the 
remaining 37 % of shares, belonging to the other main owner, were due to be acquired in 
December 2008. In June 2008, management established 13 integration workshops involving 50 
employees and managers from both companies. These workshops were tasked to map processes 
and practices and evaluate synergies and cost savings opportunities in all functions. The 13 
workshops included Logistic, Production reallocation, R&D, Benchmarking, Management 
team, Energy, Accounting, Human Resources Management, Health and Safety, Purchasing, IT, 
Legal Structure and Commercial. Each integration workshop involved 3 to 11 persons. The 
integration manager, the top management team and two employees of the three plants were in 
charge of following the progression of the 13 integration workshops. 
In this early phase employees from both side of the deal were positive towards the opportunities 
presented by the acquisition:  
“The merger plan was met with positive minds (....). When the integration process 
began, we found it very exciting to explore how another organization is working to 
reach similar goals” (Employee, Alpha-Mang). 
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Employees from Alpha-Mang and Beta-Mang were acquainted through pre-existing labor 
union affiliation and commercial relationships. Alpha-Mang informants explained that MNC-
Metals had been a “good owner” to the Norwegian plants. They appreciated the management 
style of MNC-Metals and acknowledged the investments MNC-Metals had made in the plants. 
When interacting with their new colleagues of Beta-Mang, Alpha-Mang employees 
communicated their positive perceptions of MNC-Metals and the integration process. Beta-
Mang employees described how the workshops were key arenas for developing collaborative 
relationships and sharing knowledge between the firms. They indicated that they felt that their 
voice was heard and their opinion valued: 
“I’m very satisfied with this first phase [workshops]. Alpha-Mang has included us 
in all parts of the work. We have had the possibility to give comments and to work 
as a team from day one. (Employee, Beta-Mang).  
Employees, both from Alpha-Mang and Beta-Mang, indicated that they were motivated to 
work on the development of integration initiatives through the workshops:  
It has been a lot of work but the results and the synergies, which are pointed out, 
give me a great motivation” (Employee, Beta-Mang). 
Top managers disclosed that a key concern in the integration process was respecting the 
organizational cultures and the balance of power between Alpha-Mang and Beta-Mang. Top 
management’s willingness to respect the partner was diffused into all hierarchical level and 
facilitated the emergence of a collaborative work environment. This was echoed in the accounts 
of the participants of the workshops: 
“The atmosphere in the workshop is positive. In all groups, we have focused on 
opening up, sharing knowledge and looking for synergies, which could give 
savings. Also, we have learned to know each other and work together. This will be 
important in the time to come” (Manager, Beta-Mang). 
In the summer 2008, the integration process was proceeding smoothly. Employees from both 
sides of the deal were positive about the acquisition. It was perceived as a smart move and 
organizational members were satisfied with their commitment in integration workshops. 
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Early post-acquisition: Drop in demand and crisis management 
In the fall of 2008, a collapse of steel consumption led to a dramatic drop in demand for the 
firms’ products:  
“The market had turned around: steel production in Europe, in North America and 
in China has dramatically dropped as a consequence of a brutal collapse of the 
steel consumption (…). We have gone almost overnight from a seller’s market to a 
buyer’s market. Orders are hard to find, prices are decreasing (…)” (Manager, 
Alpha-Mang). 
The drop in demand led to the deterioration of MNC-Metals’ share price. Subsequently, the 
conditions of the exchange of shares with the second shareholder could no longer be met. He 
thus postponed the sale of his shares (37%). This delay in full ownership impeded MNC-
Metals’ ability to implement the specialization of plants, thus slowing down the original 
integration plan. The delay in full ownership created uncertainty among employees about the 
future integration. Some employees voiced doubts about MNC-Metals’ full ownership of Beta-
Mang, and thus their ability to implement the integration plan and to realize the synergies.  
The drop in demand implied that managers, already burdened by integration activities, also 
needed to address the crisis. The integration team and the managers were suddenly tasked with 
the responsibilities for reducing costs and gaining gain control over inventories to avoid over-
capacity.  
During the winter of 2009, the top management team decided to temporarily shut down 
production and temporarily lay-off employees to cope with over-capacity. This resulted in 
limited activity in the plants and minimal interaction between employees:  
“Now we have temporary lay-offs, but of course, when we are in full operation 
again, and when we are allowed to travel again, then we can get access to how they 
do things, and there are synergies, specifically in R&D and operations 
management.” (Employee, Alpha-Mang). 
In addition to temporary lay-offs, managers implemented additional cost reduction actions that 
further reduced interactions between plants. Planned travels and visits between the plants were 
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cancelled and restrictions were made on future travel for line-managers and lower level 
employees. Top-level management was exempt from restrictions on travel, and the union 
representatives from the plants still interacted throughout their union networks. As one 
employee describes: 
“There are cost-cutting initiatives, so there is not a lot of travelling. It is not that 
easy to learn from one another when we can’t come and see what the others are 
doing. There is no contact across the plants.” (Employee, Beta-Mang). 
Securing low-cost access to raw materials for Beta-Mang production plants was a key driver 
behind the deal. This became even more important as the crisis hit the plants. To address the 
crisis, efforts were made to facilitate the circulation of raw materials from Alpha-Mang to Beta-
Mang and to increase the coordination between the different steps in the value chain. Alpha-
Mang’s IT systems and reporting systems were also implemented in Beta-Mang faster than 
initially planned, as the need to monitor costs increased due to the crisis. The emergent need 
for cost-control also triggered the establishment of coordination structures that were not initially 
forecasted in the integration plan. A task force was thus created and worked as an efficient 
coordination structure:  
“During the summer 2009, to face the crisis, we created a task force to manage 
inventories. The team made of Norwegians and French from the sales and the 
production departments met every 10 days. (Manager, Alpha-Mang). 
 
Organizing the temporary lay-off was a task for general managers and HR managers. HR 
managers were involved in securing compensation for employees and organizing the schedule 
for the operators and this took focus away from integration issues. Management resources were 
also involved in extensive communication with the organization to mitigate employee unrest 
and worries about lay-offs. 
Management attention and resources were already strained from integration efforts, and, 
dealing with the crisis further spread attention and resources more thinly still. The increased 
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focus on financial reporting and coordinating cost initiatives was time consuming for top 
managers, line managers and controlling function. In addition, these initiatives were described 
by the plant managers as having shifted management attention from coordination and building 
ties between the plants, to managing issues within each plant.  
“We have been allowed to loosen the tie to the other plants to focus on this plant. 
We are running at a lower capacity, we have a different culture, and there will be 
lower production before there is an up-turn, so I think it is right to let our plant run 
its own, independent developmental process and self-cultivate” (Alpha-Mang 
manager). 
The delay in full ownership and the crisis management initiatives created some uncertainties 
about the acquisition amongst employees and their initial positive perceptions of the merits of 
the acquisition waned. As the drop in demand hit the plants, employees’ perceptions about the 
cause of the crisis became blurred. Employees tended to blame the acquisition for the economic 
troubles and the shutdown of the plants. As described by these Alpha-Mang managers:  
“We had to manage the risk of confusion between crisis related issues and 
integration issues in [Beta-Mang] employees’ mind. We had to communicate a lot 
to clarify the situation” (Alpha-Mang Sales VP). 
“The main challenge now for us, as leaders, is to communicate and make people 
understand the crisis.” (Alpha-Mang manager). 
In addition to the confusion around the cause of the economic problems, employees also 
claimed that Beta-Mang management would have handled the crisis better than Alpha-Mang. 
For example, when addressing the shutdown of his plant, one Beta-Mang employee described: 
“We at Beta-Mang, we would have done differently (regarding plant shutdown)”. One manager 
described how the fear and discontent about the crisis “spilled over” into perceptions about the 
acquisition: 
“When everything is OK, people are happy with the merger with Alpha-Mang. 
When there is a negative situation, it’s Alpha-Mang’s fault. Employees in my plant 
think that the crisis would have been softer without Alpha-Mang” (Plant Manager, 
Beta-Mang).  
In parallel, our informants described their perceptions of “fighting against a common enemy” 
and “being in the same boat” as all the plants were exposed to the drop in demand and shared 
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the same challenges in dealing with this crisis. Beta-Mang and Alpha-Mang employees and 
managers described that they needed to work together in a cohesive way to cooperate and face 
the crisis.  
“When the crisis hit us, we all stuck together. Nobody tried to save himself at the 
expense of others. We were not pulling dirty tricks on each other. People were 
trying to solve the problems; they were helping each other whatever their plants or 
their nationalities. I would say that we were solidary in adversity. I wonder whether 
this will last once the crisis is over” (CFO Alpha-Mang)  
Our informants also described how the crisis brought the Norwegian plants together as they 
were lobbying for resources in competition with all production units worldwide in a strained 
MNC. Informants described the importance of making the Norwegian plants as an entity geared 
towards competing with low-cost resources in the rest of the world:  
“The challenge is to make MNC-Metals happy with us. They are global, and can 
get their ore processed in other places (…). Our challenge is to make sure the 
Norwegian plants are prioritized in the future.” (Beta-Mang employee) 
Employees in the acquired plant voiced their fear of losing bargaining power at the plant level. 
As one of many plants in MNC-Metals, they felt alienated and removed from decisions made 
at the headquarters in Paris. Pre-acquisition they had been close to decision making processes 
and without other plants competing for resources. As the decision to temporarily shut down 
production was made, the acquired plant employees were concerned about the future of their 
plants, as MNC-Metals had many other plants they could use. 
“Now people here feel the competition. We are three of sixteen furnaces in Norway, 
and we have to do what we can do to make sure that our furnaces are up and 
running. We cannot produce to store anymore. We are publicly listed and 
everything needs to be reported. We are challenged on the numbers – what last 
month’s numbers were. (…) there is now competition between the plants about who 
gets to produce.” (Beta-Mang employee) 
“If you compare us with the other plants (in Norway) we are at the top. (…) We 
have to show them that we are good, so that we get the necessary investments to 
run the plant the way it was run before. “(Beta-Mang employee) 
In the same vein, the existing Alpha-Mang plants in Norway were concerned about internal 
competition from the newly acquired plant. The pre-acquisition relationship between the two 
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Alpha-Mang plants in Norway had been very competitive. The crisis and the acquisition 
increased competition for resources from the French headquarters of MNC-Metals. In one of 
the Alpha-Mang plants their fear was grounded in their perception of the other plant was closer 
to the top management of the Norwegian subsidiary:  
“We are further away from the corporate [Norwegian] headquarter, and they are 
prioritized (…) that is where the management team is, they are preferred” 
(Employee, Alpha-Mang). 
Beyond fears and perceptions, facts and figures about cut backs on investments from MNC-
Metals headquarters were an objective measure of an increased competition between plants:  
“In terms of investments, if something breaks or something needs an 





Later post-acquisition: Back to normal operations and finalizing integration 
After twelve months of uncertainty, demand increased in September 2009. The plants 
resumed to normal production levels, temporary lay-offs ceased and integration 
activities were continued. In the spring of 2010, the planned integration activities had 
all been carried out.  
Our informants described how the crisis had pushed some aspects of the integration 
process forward unintentionally, as crisis management efforts were conducive to hunting 
for new ideas and solutions: 
“The crisis literally boosted the hunt for new ideas and solutions. Some decisions 
taken to manage the crisis, even if they had no direct link with the synergies, had a 
positive effect on the integration process. This effervescence of solution was very 
good for the success of the integration” (Manager, Alpha-Mang).  
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We observed that of the five integration objectives defined by top managers in the pre-deal 
phase to create value from the acquisition, some were implemented faster and some were 
delayed. On the one hand, IT Systems integration, optimization of raw material supply and 
coordination in purchasing and logistics were carried out sooner than planned as a result of the 
crisis management activities. Managers described how the crisis management initiatives pushed 
forward the integration process:  
“Before the merger, we had defined a schedule for the implementation of our cost 
control and cash management software in the plants acquired. Because of the 
crisis, we had to accelerate its implementation; consequently, we now have efficient 
reporting six months in advance compared to what was initially planned” 
(Manager, Alpha-Mang).  
On the other hand, the crisis management initiatives to control costs and avoid over-capacity 
together with lack of full ownership had led to a delay in plant specialization and knowledge 
transfer. Indeed, employees could not meet up to share best practices because of temporary lay-
offs and cut back in travel expenses, thus slowing down these integration activities. 
Tables A.2 and A.3 detail the integration objectives that were reached faster or slower as a result 
of crisis management initiatives. 
INSERT TABLES A.2 AND A.3 HERE 
In addition to accelerating or slowing down the implementation of synergies, we also observed 
that management structures put in place during the crisis became permanent structures after the 
plants resumed normal production levels. This was because they were conducive to integration 
at the Norwegian level and also functioned as wider integration mechanisms within MNC-
Metals. As a manager explains:  
“This task force was supposed to be a transient structure of adjustment during the 
crisis. But as it worked out very well, we decide to perennialize this mode of 
management” (Manager, MNC-Metals).  
“We created task forces to manage inventories. We involved people from 
management control, purchasing, sales and production. These structures were 
created spontaneously to face the crisis and they actually last because they work. 
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They help strengthening the ties between Paris and Norway and also between the 
different plants” (CFO Alpha-Mang).  
 
Post-acquisition integration as embedded in the context of co-evolving 
processes  
We identified three simultaneously unfolding processes in our case; post-acquisition 
integration, crisis management and ongoing operations of the plants. Whereas we identified 
these processes as conceptually distinct and discernible, our findings also show how they were 
nested and intertwined. Organizational members’ perceptions and actions, and the outcomes of 
post-acquisition integration were shaped by their perceptions and actions, and the outcomes of 
the processes of crisis management and ongoing operations. Thus, the integration outcomes we 
observed could not be attributed solely to integration decisions and initiatives.  
First, we observed that crisis management initiatives shifted employees’ perceptions about the 
acquisition. Initially employees were cooperative and optimistic about the future coordination 
of the value chain. With the event of the crisis they developed negative attitudes towards the 
acquisition, as they confused organizational crisis issues with post-acquisition integration 
related issues. Employees’ positive perceptions about the merits of the acquisition vanished as 
they perceived that crisis management initiatives to avoid over-capacity could have been 
implemented differently. In this manner, perceptions of the crisis and the acquisition were 
muddled. 
Second, the actions aimed at managing the drop in demand had unintended consequences for 
the unfolding integration process. For example, shutdown in production and cost-cutting 
initiatives limited interactions between employees from the three plants and reduced knowledge 
transfer that was a key part of the original integration plan. Also, we observed that the 
coordination structure implemented to cope with over-capacity was then subsequently sustained 
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as an integration structure to facilitate coordination between the Norwegian subsidiary and 
headquarters. In this manner, actions and outcomes of the crisis, ongoing operations and 
acquisition were muddled.  
Third, we observed the feed-back loop, wherein the outcomes of the various processes 
contributed to the perceptions of the acquisition or the crisis. For example, purchasing and 
logistics were coordinated across the plants six months ahead of schedule as part of the crisis 
management initiatives. This, in turn, shaped organizational members’ perceptions of the 
acquisition. 
Our findings show that post-acquisition integration does not unfold as a self-contained process 
but rather that it is embedded within a set of co-evolving organizational processes. Each 
dimension of a process (perceptions, actions, outcomes), is nested and mutually constitutive 
with those of the other processes, making the various processes intertwined.  
INSERT FIGURE A.4. ABOUT HERE 
The dynamic tensions of post-acquisition-integration 
We identified four mechanisms at work in the integration process that arise from the set of co-
evolving processes presented above: coordination, cohesion, disconnection, and alienation.  
First, coordination and cohesion facilitated integration. Crisis management initiatives boosted 
the hunt for solutions to face the drop in demand. For example, task-force structures that 
enhanced coordination of activities between the plants were established thus improving task 
integration. Furthermore, organizational members ‘perceptions of the crisis as a common 
enemy to fight against, fostered cohesion between the three plants, thus enhancing human 
integration. 
Second, disconnection and alienation impeded integration. Competition between plants and 
lack of knowledge sharing generated disconnection between employees and impeded task 
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integration. Organizational members perceived themselves as not belonging to MNC-Metals 
and felt excluded from decision-making processes in MNC-Metals, leading to their alienation 
from the acquiring firm. Such alienation impeded human integration. 
Overall, our findings show that coordination and cohesion are mechanisms that facilitate 
integration while disconnection and alienation are mechanisms that impede integration. Our 
emergent model conceptualizes the tension between coordination and disconnection and the 
tension between cohesion and alienation as tensions between facilitators and impediments of 
integration processes. We thus argue that integration processes unfold in a dialectic and 
dynamic manner with forces simultaneously impeding and facilitating integration.  






We explored how post-acquisition integration processes are shaped by strategic initiatives and 
ongoing changes in the organization exogenous to the integration process. We found that 
organizational members are faced with a host of issues and initiatives to make sense of, and act 
upon. This resulted in a complexity of intertwined perceptions, actions and outcomes. We thus 
identified post-acquisition integration as embedded in the context of co-evolving processes. 
From these co-evolving processes, we found four mechanisms at work. Coordination and 
cohesion operate as integration facilitators while disconnection and alienation operate 
integration impediments. Our model conceptualizes the tensions between integration 
facilitators and integration impediments that shape the unfolding of the integration process. We 
thus recast the integration process as embedded in a set of co-evolving processes, wherein the 
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conceptualized tensions between integration facilitators and integration impediments lead to its 
dialectic, emergent and dynamic unfolding. 
 
Contributions and Implications  
Recent calls have been made to explore the dynamics of post-acquisition integration (Graebner 
et al., 2017). Our findings contribute to the existing literature on post-M&A integration by 
exposing the complexities of these dynamics. First, we recast the post-acquisition integration 
process as embedded in a set of ongoing, simultaneous and co-evolving processes. Our findings 
identify the loci of the integration dynamics in processes exogenous to the integration process 
itself. Doing so, we show how the discrepancy between integration decision and integration 
outcomes can reside in the tensions we observed. Indeed, these tensions shape the integration 
process, diverting its intended linear trajectory.  
Second, we extend Birkinshaw et al.’s (2000) work by identifying and conceptualizing the 
micro tensions inherent in task and human integration. We highlight the dynamic tensions of 
coordination/disconnection and cohesion/alienation that impede and facilitate both sub-
processes of human and task integration and lead to the dialectic unfolding of integration.  
Third, adopting an embedded perspective, we contribute to the understanding of acquisition 
outcomes by pinpointing important “unidentified variables” (King et al., 2004) and 
“intermediate variables” (Cording et al., 2008). We challenge the conception of the integration 
process as self-contained by identifying “intermediate variables” emerging from the set of co-
evolving processes. Thus the loci of causal ambiguity between integration decisions and 
outcomes, may be exogenous to the integration process itself. The extant M&A literature has 
been rather silent as to the role of the organizational context in which post-acquisition 
integration is situated. Our findings conceptualize the mechanisms through which 
organizational context matters and thus challenge the traditional view of the boundaries of the 
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integration process. Our findings imply the need to adopt an embedded perspective on M&As 
and address post-acquisition integration as unfolding in a context of co-evolving processes. 
Finally, our study exposes the dynamic, emergent and practice based aspects of M&A 
integration that lead to the uncertainty commonly observed in post-acquisition integration 
(Teerikangas, 2012). Acquisition scholars have adopted a contingent approach that breaks with 
the original rational and intended view of post-acquisition integration (Cartwright and Cooper, 
1993; Monin et al., 2013; Vaara, 2003). From extant research both on acquisitions and on 
strategic change, we know that managerial attention (Ocasio, 2011), managerial actions 
(Colman and Lunnan, 2011; Graebner 2004), and managerial sense-making (Balogun and 
Johnson 2005) shape how strategic intent translates into intended and unintended outcomes. 
Our findings build on this literature and identify the manner in which perceptions, actions and 
outcomes unfold and interact post-acquisition. We thus theorize the contingencies and 
consequences of integration outcomes, by identifying the mechanisms through which 
integration initiatives were facilitated or impeded.  
Managerial implications 
Previous studies have emphasized the need for communication to cope with employees’ doubts 
and uncertainties post-acquisition (Angwin et al., 2016; Schweiger and Denisi, 1991). Our 
findings indicate the need for managers to take other strategic initiatives and ongoing processes 
in the organization into consideration in this communication. The M&A integration process 
should not be addressed as an isolated change effort, but rather as embedded in the 
organizational context with other confounding issues. It is important to gauge employees’ 
perceptions of all changes and develop sensitive and targeted communication. Overall, in an 
M&A, managers should communicate clearly, proactively and interactively (Angwin et al., 
2016) to enable organizational members to distinguish the decisions taken as a consequence of 
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the integration and the decisions taken as a consequence of other processes exogenous to the 
integration process.  
Our findings suggest that managers should adopt a less myopic view when evaluating the 
progress and efficiency of post-acquisition integration. Adopting an embedded perspective, 
managers can embrace the multiple objectives and the complexities of intertwined and co-
evolving process. For instance, they could assess the capacity of their integration managers and 
teams (Trichterborn et al., 2016) to adapt and redefine integration initiatives in a changing 
integration context. Recasting the integration process as an embedded process implies the need 
to adopt a broader, more contextualized view to evaluate post-acquisition integration efficiency.  
Boundary conditions and future directions 
Our work is not without limitations and each of these limitations opens an avenue for future 
research. First, our case focuses on an acquisition implementation within one subsidiary of an 
MNC. The integration process is thus limited to one institutional context and does not 
encompass issues of national cultural differences and geographical distance. Future research 
could replicate our work on integration processes involving cross-border units to study how the 
integration process is embedded in a larger set of co-evolving processes at the level of the MNC.  
Second, in our case the acquiring firm needed to mitigate the consequences of a drop in demand 
while carrying out the integration process. The economic crisis significantly reduced the 
amount of organizational slack available and forced managers to focused on cost reducing 
activities and short-term profitability. Integration initiatives with less certain and immediate 
performance improvement effects were inhibited. If the acquiring firm was facing a change that 
increased organizational slack, this could reduce the urgency for cost reduction actions and 
increase focus on activities, such as knowledge exchange, that might lead to longer-term 
performance improvement. Other events and processes may affect merging organizations, and 
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facilitate or impede integration. For instance, a sudden increase in demand, regulatory changes, 
stock market booms, political shocks, scandals and corruption may all shape the integration 
process. In the case of serial acquirers, there are continuous and overlapping integration or 
restructuring processes, both likely to influence the focal integration process. Future researches 
could replicate our study in other contexts to continue deepening our understanding of how 
events and processes, exogenous to the integration process itself, affect merging organizations. 
Third, as our case study illustrates, although post-acquisition integration processes are major 
events in an organization, they may be embedded in a variety of ongoing organizational 
processes and events as important as an integration process. The event of a major crisis may 
shape the integration process in a different manner than a more minor event. Future research 
could examine a variety of events with various significances and impacts to further analyze 
their impeding and facilitating effects on the integration process. 
Overall, we conclude that multi-vocal influences are likely on the focal integration process, and 
applying an embedded perspective is valuable for understanding how the integration process 
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Table A.1. Breakdown of Interviews (n = 151) by Company, Hierarchical Level, and 
Period 






Fall 2009 to Winter 
2010 
Round 3 




MNC-Metals managers 7 6 7 20 
Alpha-Mang managers 8 5 7 20 
Alpha-Mang employees 15 15 13 43 
Beta-Mang managers 9 10 9 28 
Beta-Mang employees 17 13 10 40 




















T0 => T9 T0 => T3 
Implementation of IT systems in Beta-
Mang plants was accelerated to better 




T0 => T12 T0 => T3 
Optimization of raw material supply was 
accelerated to secure low-cost access to 
raw material and subsequently reduce 




T0 => T12 T0 => T6 
Coordination in purchasing and logistics 




                                                          
















Plant specialization T0 => T12 T0 => T18 
Plant specialization was delayed because 





T0 => T12 T0 => T18 
Knowledge transfer was delayed 
because of temporary lay-offs and cut 
back on travel expenses. Employees 
could not meet to share best practices. 
 
  
                                                          





















Figure A.5. The dynamic tensions of post-acquisition integration 
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